Terrorism vs. Resistance

Nathan Field has an outstanding analysisin Abu Dhabi National on the distinction between terrorism and resistance in the Arab society. 3 critical ideas that article underscores: first, that the Arab media makes a sharp distinction between terrorism and resistance, the thing that directly influenced the stance Al Qaeda and Hezbollah hold in the Arab world. Secondly, Al Qaeda’s efforts to “rebrand” itself as part of the resistance. Thirdly, Al Qaeda’s endeavors to posses a foothold in the Levant.

These ideas mainly expose the context in which Al Qaeda is currently functioning in. Al Qaeda expected that it would not only be part of the resistance but actually to be the vanguard of this line against the infidels, who are occupying the or trying to dominate the Muslim societies, but the problem was that Al Qaeda secluded itself from the society and started not only to evaluate it but actually to judge it and that was a very sensitive issue in the Muslim and especially the Arab societies that are facing several social, political and economic problems, a clear example for that was in Iraq, when Abu Musab al Zarqawi diverted his efforts to “massacring Shiites and killing fellow Sunnis deemed insufficiently pious” he lost the Arabs sympathy. The important point that could be noticed was the reason behind Al Qaeda’s failure; which was failing to situate itself as the defender of the Arabs rights, more importantly was failing to display its operations as gains to the Arabs’s causes. Note something, the Arabs perceived what happened in 9/11 as a divinely punishment to the unjust, rather than a successful hit done by Mujahedeen, yet, western media falsely displayed these sentiments as gloating to what happened. Thus the sharp distinction drawn by the Arab media came as a consequence to what the people actually believed in, and not vice versa. On the other hand, Hezbollah knew how to situate itself as a struggler; it did not engage in any religious judgements or evaluations and focused on presenting itself as liberation movement that is wide enough to include the whole society with all its contradictions.

The dilemma that faces Al Qaedais that its activities seem chaotic and thus what the people understand about it, is that it aims to destroy and eradicate all societal forms that do not conform with its blinkered vision, thus the question that some people pose in the Arab world is “What would happen to us if a group like Al Qaeda or Al Jihad seized power in the country?”, theres a belief that the adherents of this trend won’t be tolerable with their own people, they won’t even be understanding to what the pressuring economic conditions forced them to do in order to make a living. However, there’s another side to this point that these chaotic activities are re-presented within a new context that makes more sense, Al Qaeda realizes that there’s an increasing level of resentment with the failed states in the region, and as it operates devoid of any political considerations, thus it will be a mean for some people to confront and change their bad conditions.

Al Qaeda’s attempt to “rebrand” itself might be the most important point here, that attempt is not only a big challenge for Al Qaeda itself to develop its parochial vision and to broaden its horizons, but mainly to those who are fighting it, since if it managed to “rebrand” itself successfully, it will acquire a huge recruiting capacity, and greater mobility, not to mention getting actually accepted socially, which means that it would trun to be part of the Arab milieu. Al Qaeda is causing a confusion among Salafis who couldn’t excommunicate Al Qaeda’s members, however, Salafis acknowledge some of the fallacies Al Qaeda fell into, thats actually what Nathan pointed out concerning Al Awajj’s dance around a question he was asked; whether Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda members are ”terrorists” or “fighters”?. Let’s note something here, the importance of the Jihadi revisions made be some militant groups, especially Sayyid Imams’, is that they call for adopting new approach in dealing with the current deteriorating conditions or the police-governments, since the violent approach would cause more harm to the society that it would really effect the regime. But this call was perceived, by Salafis, as a turn against the idea of Jihad; that’s basically to ”change” whats wrong in the society and that “change” is a religious obligation for every Muslim, the difference here is over: how the change should be done? So, Al Qaeda needs to insert itself in the society as one of the partisans capable of changing, then to enhance its position becoming the leader of that change.

The most important defiant facing Al Qaeda now is Hezbollah. Al Qaeda did not operate in the Levant, because it never had the haven and the welcoming environment. On the other hand, no doubt that security was the foremost success the “failed” states achieved. So, eradicating Hezbollah is not merely a political benefit, but more importantly, it would be a strategic benefit, Al Qaeda is aware that there’s no part that could fill Hezbollah’s place as fast and efficient as Al Qaeda could do. The problem in this regard is that many many players in the region are disturbed with Hezbollah’s stature; consequently, some of these players might -indirectly- help Al Qaeda in bringing down Hezbollah.